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THE HIGH STAKES OF WTO REFORM
James Thuo Gathii*
BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF TRADE NEGOTIA
TIONS!fHE LESSONS OF CANCUN. By Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa.
London: Zed Books. Updated Edition, 2004. Pp. vi, 329. Cloth, $58.95;
paper, $19.95.
INTRODUCTION

Behind the Scenes at the WTO definitively exposes how the trade
negotiation process makes it possible for a few rich countries to dominate
the trade agenda at the expense of all other countries. It is one of the first
studies that authoritatively shows how trade negotiations have developed
into "a game for high stakes, between unequally matched teams, where
much of the game is played with few rules and no referee" (p. 50). The book
attributes the deadlocked nature of the Doha Round of multilateral trade
negotiations and the recent disruptions of the World Trade Organization's
("WTO") ministerial meetings to the secretive and noninclusive nature of
3
1
2
negotiations and decisionmaking at the WT0. Authors Jawara and Kwa
base their conclusions on semistructured interviews with a broad cross
section of trade officials from all over the world who represent their gov
ernments in thirty-three missions at the WTO, on interviews with staffers of
4
the WTO Secretariat, and on their own research.
Through numerous examples, the authors show why developing coun
tries in the past have been unable to prevail over the big trading countries at
the WTO (pp. 150-83). The authors conclude that to be effective, low
income developing countries must either unite as a bloc (p. 182) or hang on
to the hope that they will prevail by virtue of the strength or merits of their
arguments (p. 150). By captivating their readers with the intrigues behind
the scenes at the WTO, the authors introduce a welcome realism about how
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1.
W hile the 2003 edition of the book focuses primarily on the 2001 Doha Ministerial and
the lead-up to it, the 2004 updated edition also includes an extensive introduction focusing on the
2003 Cancun Ministerial and its aftermath.
2.

Freelance International Trade and Development Analyst.
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Trade Analyst, Focus on the Global South (a policy research and activist organization).

Pp. 1- 2. To their credit, the authors note that the sources of the information on which the
book is based "are well-informed, reliable sources inside the WTO system; most observed the events
they described at first hand; and their accounts have been independently corroborated wherever
possible. " Pp. 148-4 9.
4.
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5
trade negotiations actually work and how developing countries "find them
selves locked in a vicious cycle of political impotence, unfair trading rules
and weakening trade performance" (p. 182).
It is a book that the theoreticians of the WTO cannot afford to ignore be
cause while it confirms much of the theoretical literature, it also adds
significant insights. First, I will examine this literature before showing how
Jawara and Kwa go beyond it. This literature, based on anecdotal evidence
but primarily driven by theory, has sought to explain the disruptions and
deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations, particularly since the collapses
of the Seattle Ministerial meeting in 1999 and the Cancun Ministerial in

2003. The basic premise in this literature has been that the WTO faces a
democratic deficit arising from lack of transparency in the negotiating proc
6
ess and lack of diverse participation of stakeholders within the WT0.
Previous scholarship on multilateral trade negotiations has similarly noted
the "pyramidal bargaining" model of great power dominance; others have
7
referred to it as "vertical multilateralism." During the cold war, the United
States supported multilateralism and international economic institutions as a
strategy to persuade industrial nations to join a U.S.-led alliance in support
8
of free markets and against the Soviet Union. From this vantage point, mul
tilateralism was not a commitment to cooperating on issues of third world
development, but rather to establishing a U.S.-led commitment in favor of
free markets and U.S. geopolitical interests.

5. Gregory C. Shaffer's article, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democ
racy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. I, 4 (2001), also advocates the adoption of a sociolegal approach that focuses on a

micro, rather than a macro, understanding of those elements that actually shape legal outcomes in
connection with the trade regime. See also GREGORY c. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PuBLIC
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION, at ix-xi (2003 ).

6.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye point out that this lack of participation and transparency
amounts to a democratic deficit.Democratic deficit thus reflects what they argue is a "lack of effec
tive politicians who link organizations to constituencies. " Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ,

The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFF1CIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM
264 , 265 (R. Porter et al. eds., 2001).

7. GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION
3 54 (1986) (arguing that pyramidal bargaining during the Tokyo Round "whereby negotiations were

initiated by the major nations . .. only after important decisions had been made and compromises
had been struck . .. . caused resentment, particularly among the developing countries which were
most frequently excluded from the process "); Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large
Numbers, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 295, 3 02--0 5 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1 993 ) (describing
pyramidal bargaining in the early years of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT"));
see also WINHAM, supra, at 64- 65, 174-75, 177-78. Kahler notes that "hegemonic power has often
been portrayed as the only solution to multilateral collective action dilemmas after 1945 . . . . "
Kahler, supra, at 299. Kahler is skeptical of this view; for his proposed solutions for negotiating in
big numbers, see id. at 316-21.

8. MELVYN P. LEFFLER, A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE TRUMAN
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE COLD WAR 17 (1992); see also Gautam Sen, The United States and the
GATTIWTO System, in us HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 115, 1 17 (Rosemary
Foot et al. eds., 2003 ) ("US paramountcy and the challenge to it from communism defined the politics

of the post-Second World War world. The political, economic, and military primacy of the US was the
most significant influence on the negotiations over the post-war inlemational economic order. ").
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In the late 1980s, when the United States enhanced its controversial

§ 301 unilateral powers to punish violators of its trade rights without re
course to the multilateral GATT framework, some scholars argued that this
version of "muscular" or great-power leadership is permissible as long as it
increases trade liberalization, even if such unilateralism is inconsistent with
9
the letter and spirit of the WTO's compulsory dispute settlement system.
Thus multilateralism within the GATT was for the most part limited to what
the United States regarded as its core values. In the absence of agreement
among its allies, the United States often abandoned these values for outright
U.S. leadership. Medium- and low-income countries that dissented from
10
these values or rejected U.S. leadership often felt the brunt of U.S. will.

Behind the Scenes at the WTO insightfully exposes how pyramidal bar
gammg

works

within

a

highly

secretive

organization

in

which

decisionmaking processes are still dominated by its richest members: the
United States, the European Union, Canada, and Japan (referred to as the
Quad), just as in the old GATT (pp. 56-59, 149). Thus, decisions on impor
tant issues are made without broad-based consultation with the entire WTO
''
membership and the domestic constituencies of member countries. The
decisionmaking process at the WTO is further hobbled by the fact that most
of the least-developed countries are not even represented in Geneva, where
these decisions are made (pp. 22, 274, 293). Even developing countries that
have representation in Geneva are stretched too thinly to attend the more
than one thousand formal and informal meetings, symposia, workshops, and
seminars held under the auspices of WTO bodies to negotiate or discuss new
or existing trade rules or disputes about the application and interpretation of
these rules (p. 22). In this and many other ways, Behind the Scenes at the

WTO exposes some of the theoretical literature's mythical depiction of the
WTO as a faceless, bureaucratic, and technocratic institution. Behind the

Scenes at the WTO also sheds new light by exposing the manner and extent
to which the views of many in its membership are underrepresented, if not
entirely absent from the table.
9.
Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRES·
SIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 3 01 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 113 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1 9 90 ). A WTO panel later declined to find the powers in§ 3 01 to be
inconsistent with the WTO's compulsory dispute settlement system under which only the dispute set
tlement body can find violations of a member's WTO obligations. See Panel Report, United States
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 'l! 7.22, WT/DS152/ R (Dec. 22, 1 9 9 9 ).
10.
See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004); James Thuo Gathii , Humanizing the Pax-Americana Global
Empire, 4 WASH. u. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 121 (2005) (book review).
11. The exclusion of developing countries from behind-the-scenes negotiations and the disquiet
among them dates as far back as the Kennedy and Tokyo GATT rounds. See WINHAM, supra note 7, at
354 (noting that pyramidal bargaining caused resentment among developing countries). Winham also
notes:
The major political difficulty in concluding the Tokyo Round was the opposition of the develop
ing countries. This opposition was a product of several specific disputes and of a more generalized
belief that the overall benefits of the accords were not sufficiently in the interests of developing
countries to warrant their acceptance.
Id. at 3 03 .
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Ultimately, Behind the Scenes goes one step beyond the current theoreti
cal literature on the nature of reforms needed at the WTO. The major
premise in this literature has been that organizational and procedural re
forms at the WTO will resolve its legitimacy crisis. Jawara and Kwa
recognize that while transparency and organizational reforms are important
for the legitimacy of the WTO, reform must also focus on the manner in
which the WTO agenda is currently biased in favor of the interests of its
most-developed members at the expense of less affluent members.

Behind the Scenes shows the tactics deployed by developed countries to
inhibit developing countries from negotiating for more favorable rules or to
incapacitate them from changing preexisting rules that are rigged against
12
them, such as the rules in the agricultural sector. These tactics include "di
vide and rule" strategies against coalitions opposed to developed-country
interests, arm-twisting countries and pressuring delegates into submission,
black-listing ambassadors opposed to the agenda of the Quad countries and
the United States in particular, and drafting and directing texts while ignor
ing the views of developing countries (pp. xxxv-xlvi, 148-83, 272-76).
These tactics help developed countries to push through their agendas over
the objections of developing countries. By exposing these tactics, the book
recognizes that power imbalances between powerful and less powerful
countries in setting the agenda is a factor in the crisis at the WTO. Most
simply put, it is not that developing countries are suspicious of freer trade,
13
as a former Director General of the WTO has argued, but rather that they
are suspicious of the rigged and distorted nature of the decisionmaking
process and its outcomes, which--contrary to what the WTO stands for
often look little or nothing like free-trade rules.
Like Jawara and Kwa's book, this Review proceeds from the premise
that the ascendant analysis of WTO reform, which focuses on efforts to in
crease public involvement and to improve transparency and reduce secrecy,
may be insufficient to counterbalance the dominant trade interests at the
14
WTO that currently favor the richest countries in the world. If undertaken
in isolation from some of the pressing needs of developing countries, such
as comprehensive agricultural reform, well-meaning transparency and par
ticipatory reforms will prove ineffectual to resolve the legitimacy crisis at
the WTO. Indeed, if the trade agenda continues to expand into areas in
which developed countries have a comparative advantage while leaving un
addressed outstanding issues within �existing agreements that are currently
inimical to the interests of developing countries, such expansions will likely
erode the gains of any reforms aimed at the effective and full participation

12. I develop these arguments in James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance in WTO Refonn,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 885 (2004).
13. MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE AND
GLOBAL GovERNANCE 133 (2003).
14.
See Gathii, supra note 12. Jawara and Kwa note that even if all the procedural reforms
they propose "were implemented in full, while they might help to limit the major developed coun
tries' abuse of their political and economic power, they would fall far short of preventing it." P. 278.
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of developing countries and their citizens in the decision- and policymaking
of theWTO.
Thus, while increasing public involvement and improving transparency
are critical to give all WTO members fair representation in decisionmaking,
there is an equally compelling case for addressing the bias by which the
industrial and service sectors are more liberalized than agriculture and other
sectors important to developing countries. It is my basic claim that organiza
tional and procedural deficiencies at theWTO only partially account for the
collapse of the ministerial conferences in Seattle and Cancun and the legiti
macy crisis of theWTO in general. Substantive issues such as the exclusion
of agricultural and commodity trade from the free-trade mandate of the
GAIT and WTO and the bias favoring sectors in which developed countries
have a comparative advantage further exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of the
global trade regime. I therefore join with Jawara and Kwa when they regard
as interrelated and inseparable their proposals for reforming the negotiation
framework by making it more transparent on the one hand, with reforms
aimed at addressing substantive issues of interest to developing countries
such as development and access to essential medicines-on the other. As
Ann Capling has persuasively argued, internal governance reforms are "in
15
trinsically linked" to "developing country problems in theWT0."
In Part I, I summarize the main themes in Behind the Scenes at the WTO.
In particular, I focus on Jawara and Kwa's discussion of the breakdown of
the negotiation process and inattention to questions of development within
the WTO. In Part II, I discuss how the dispute-settlement system and the
rigged nature of the rules relating to agricultural trade compound the legiti
macy crisis in the WTO. In the Conclusion, I reflect on some reform
proposals.
I. MAJOR THEMES IN Behind the Scenes at the WTO
A. Problems with the Negotiating Process
The authors contend that the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements as well
as the 200 1 Doha negotiating mandate (p. xv) were imposed on developing
countries by developed countries (pp. 62-64, 67, 78). The result has been
that the playing field of the trading regime-its benefits and its negotiating
framework-has been lopsided, favoring developed countries and harming
the interests of developing countries (pp. xi, 93, 11 8-27, 269-7 1). On the
very first page of the book, the authors argue that while developing coun
tries "profoundly disagreed" with the negotiating agenda at the 2001 Doha
Ministerial conference, developed countries beat them "into submission"
after a night-long meeting held after the scheduled end of the ministerial and
after "the departure of some developing-country delegations" (p. xv; see

15.
Ann Capling, The Multilateral Trading System at Risk?: Three Challenges to the World
Trade Organization, in THE WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE
37, 50 ( Ross P. Buckley ed., 2003); see also Gathii, supra note 12.
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also p. 103). In addition, delegates from francophone countries participated
in the Doha Ministerial meeting without simultaneous interpretation or
French translations of the documents under discussion (pp. 97-98). The
book traces the tactics that developed countries and the WTO Secretariat
have used to ensure that their agenda prevails. The Cancun (pp. lvii-lxxii)
and Doha (pp. 19fr-215, 222-23, 227-30, 275-77, 304--06) Ministerial
meetings are the most important case studies examined in the book. The
Hong Kong Ministerial of December 2005 was held after the publication of
the 2004 edition of Jawara and Kwa's book and is not therefore examined in
this Review.
Jawara and Kwa argue that in return for allowing the Doha Round of
talks and to avoid the lopsidedness of the Uruguay Round agreements,
developing countries were promised three concessions: first, that a devel
opment agenda would be at the heait of the new negotiations; second, that
explicit consensus would be a prerequisite to negotiating new trade agree
ments to encompass transparency in government procurement, trade
facilitation, competition, and investment ("the Singapore issues"); and third,
that there would be an agreement on a Ministerial Declaration on the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPs") and public health, addressing problems of access to essential
medicines and focusing on permitting compulsory licensing. The authors
argue that in light of the events surrounding the failure of the Cancun Minis
terial meeting in September 2003, "all three [promises] were worthless"
(p. xv).
The authors celebrate the fact that at the Cancun Ministerial, develop
ing-country unity-particularly through the coalition of twenty developing
countries that formed ("the Group of 20"}-prevented developed countries
from extending the Cancun Ministerial into the wee hours and playing "last
minute brinkmanship to ram through their agenda" (p. xvi; see also pp. 110-12, 135) as they did at the Doha Ministerial (pp. 102--05). By announcing
the end of the Cancun Ministerial conference at 2:30 P.M. on its last sched
uled day, September 14, 2003, the Mexican Foreign Affairs Minister was
acquiescing to the "disbelief, acrimony and anger"-especially within the
Group of 20---that the positions of developing countries had been "entirely
disregarded" in the September 13 draft of the Ministerial Declaration that
would otherwise have emerged from Cancun (p. xvi). For example, the draft
included a negotiating mandate on the Singapore issues although there was
no explicit consensus on proceeding with any of them.
Pascal Lamy, the European Communities Trade Commissioner at the
time of the Cancun Ministerial and now the Director General of the WTO,
summarized the failure of the meeting in the following terms: "The WTO
remains a medieval organization. . . . The procedures and rules of this or
ganization have not supported the weight of the task. There is no way to
structure and steer discussions amongst 146 members in a manner condu-
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16
cive to consensus. The decision-making needs to be revamped." Although
the authors are skeptical of his specific reform proposals insofar as he seeks
to create a Security-Council-like executive arm within the WTO as proposed
17
in the Sutherland Report, they certainly share his assessment that the
WTO's negotiating process has broken down and-like some developing
country delegations-they propose a more democratic and transparent proc
ess through which all views will be taken into account (pp. xxii, 222-27).
Jawara and Kwa then consider how the Cancun Ministerial exemplified
the breakdown of the negotiating process through a discussion of how the
Singapore issues, agriculture, cotton, TRIPs and public health, and devel
opment issues were addressed. A key objection to opening negotiations on
the Singapore issues-besides lack of explicit consensus-was the fact that
developing countries had not had an opportunity to examine the proposals
put forward as annexes to the proposed Cancun Ministerial Declaration (p.
xxv). The position taken by developed countries regarding the Doha negoti
ating mandate was that it was sufficiently flexible to permit proposals for
commencing negotiations or for setting a negotiating agenda on some or all
of the issues (pp. xxiii-iv). This position was in direct contradiction to the
understanding of developing countries that "explicit consensus" in the Doha
negotiating mandate meant that unanimity among all countries was a pre
requisite for negotiating any new commitments or even for discussing
negotiation modalities (p. xxv). Jawara and Kwa note that the European Un
ion's insistence on proceeding with negotiations on all or some of the
18
Singapore issues may very well have been the "poison pill" that killed
Cancun by diverting attention away from the more contentious issues of
agriculture on which the European Union was unwilling to yield (p. xlviii).
It is not at all clear that the European Union was willing to make any
meaningful concession in agriculture. Like the United States, the European
Union's lack of commitment to genuine agricultural trade reform is evidenced
by its refusal to commit to specific tariff reduction targets, to reduce its huge
domestic support programs, such as cotton subsidies, and to end export sub
sidies. Even with huge reductions in bound levels of trade-distorting
support, the European Union and other huge subsidizers would still have
little to lose since the bound levels of support are substantially higher than
19
actual levels of support. These refusals to genuinely reform agricultural
16. P. xxii (quoting Pascal Lamy, Press Conference Closing the World Trade Organization's
Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico (Sept. 14, 2003 )) (alteration in original).
17.
See PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., CONSULTATIVE Bo. TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL Su
PACHAI PANITCHPAKDI, THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL C HALLENGES IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 71 (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ ! Oanniv_e/
future_wto_e.pdf (proposing a consultative body among Trade Ministers in which major trading
nations "would inevitably be permanent members").
18.
See Editorial, The Cancun Failure, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 16, 2003 , at A24. Jawara and Kwa
note that by contrast, the European Union blamed the United States for scuttling the talks, p. xlix,
while the United States blamed developing countries and the G20 in particular, pp. Ii-Iii.
19.
See The July 31st 2004 WTO Agreement on Agriculture: A Critical Review, AGRITRADE
NEWS UPDATE (Technical Center for Agric. & Rural Cooperation ACP-EU, Wageningen, Neth.),
Aug. 6, 2004, http://agritrade.cta.int/alert040806-wto.htm.
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trade were a direct reason for the formation of the Group of 20 at the Can
cun Ministerial (p. xxvii). With the support of the Group of 20 and most
developing and least-developed countries, West and Central African coun
tries affected by cotton subsidies proposed a separate agreement ending all
cotton subsidies, but opposition by developed countries, particularly the
United States, killed the initiative that had become the flagship development
issue at the ministerial (pp. xxvii-xxxi). Unbelievably, the U.S. Trade Rep
resentative ("USTR") at the time, Robert Zoellick, argued that these
countries should diversify away from cotton, notwithstanding the fact that
cotton subsidies are contrary to both the spirit of liberalizing agricultural
trade-and were recently found to be against various WTO agreements by
20
the WTO's Appellate Body ("AB") -as well as to the development objec
tives that ought to be central in the Doha Round. To suggest that these
countries should diversify away from cotton although they are the most effi
cient producers of cotton demonstrates the United States' intransigent
refusal to make any meaningful concessions in agriculture.
On access to essential medicines, Jawara and Kwa reveal how secret ne
gotiations between the United States and its developed-country allies, on
one side, and four developing countries, on the other, hammered out a com
promise solution known as the Motta text (pp. xxxii, 249-57). What is
striking about the Motta text is that it was publicized as a historic agree
ment, notwithstanding its restrictions on the importation and exportation of
generic drugs that made it as burdensome as Article 31 of the TRIPs agree
ment, which it was intended to moderate (p. xxxii). The restrictions it
imposed on compulsory licensing undermine such a rosy view. The burden
some requirements of the Motta text, which include a requirement that the
TRIPs Council have authority to monitor individual compulsory licenses,
resulted in a "cosmetic," "painful two-year exercise" to make the United
States "appear sympathetic towards development and deflect international
criticism, while in reality protecting its own commercial interests"
(p. xxxiii). Jawara and Kwa uncovered evidence that Kenyan negotiators,
among others, objected to the Motta text and that Kenyan consent was pro
cured by a call placed to the Kenyan Trade Minister, who was informed that
21
Kenya was the only holdout nation on the deal.

In October 2005, the U.S. offered to cut its agricultural subsidies as a signal to other WTO
members of its commitment to continuing the deadlock in the Doha Round. However, the U.S.'s
proposal to cut its huge subsidies would have merely reallocated the amounts given to farms as
subsidies to other types of grants. See Press Release, Oxfam, U.S. Farm Subsidies Offer
Smoke and Mirrors (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ox fam.org.uk/press/release/trade_
ussubsidies l 0 l 005.htm.
20.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/
AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
21. Jawara and Kwa also describe how U.S. negotiators called the president of an African
country following objections by a negotiator from that country to an issue of particular interest to
the United States. The U.S. negotiator then told the African negotiator that the president of their
country was supportive of the U.S. position since the president recognized that supporting the issue
would translate into continued access to the U.S. market under the African Growth and Opportunity
Act. Pp. 86- 87. For a discussion of the actions of a Ugandan ambassador who pushed a developing
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Ultimately, it is not only that the negotiating process at WTO ministerial
meetings has broken down; there is more. Jawara and Kwa note, for exam
ple, that "the preparatory process for Cancun was even less transparent than
those for Seattle and Doha-and, it seemed, deliberately so" (p. xxxv). In
addition, the book discusses "green room" meetings, which are closed meet
ings between a select group of countries--often with Quad countries at the
center-where no minutes are kept, yet important decisions are made and
imposed on the rest of the membership (pp. 17-18, 75, 133-35).
There are other pressures brought to bear in the negotiating process that
those responsible have no reason to continue except to undermine the multi
lateral nature of negotiating under the WTO umbrella. For example,
powerful WTO members like the United States and the European Union
have used their development assistance programs and preferential trading
programs as a carrot and stick to prevail upon developing countries with
objections to their agendas (pp. 152-59). These powerful countries also
sometimes threaten the careers of developing-:country diplomats at Geneva
who object to their agendas by contacting their superiors in order to pressure
them into acquiescing (pp. 150-52). Such actions create an atmosphere of
intimidation and facilitate the ability of powerful countries to push through
objectionable policies.
Tactics that question the integrity and threaten the careers of otherwise
committed diplomats were also used by powerful countries against small
countries in the run-up to the vote on United Nations Security Council
22
Resolution 1441, relating to Iraq. The United States has used a variety of
other pressures and incentives, including signing bilateral trade deals with
compliant countries to undermine the ability of developing countries to take
a common position on matters of mutual interest in WTO negotiations (pp.

163-64), promises of technical assistance to buy off countries with views
different from the United States (pp. 169-70, 176-77), and rewards of fi
nancial assistance for cooperation with the United States in nontrade areas
such as debt relief and security arrangements for the U.S. war on terrorism
(pp. 174-75, 272). These pressures buy support from countries otherwise
hesitant to back the United States' WTO agenda (pp. 164-66, 173).
The WTO's negotiating process is simply in a total mess. Developed
countries have opposed the adoption of clear negotiating rules governing
how all WTO members arrive at decisions in a transparent, inclusive and
participatory manner. Ministerial meetings are held over the space of a few
days with the result that the negotiations are conducted in a pressure-cooker
atmosphere. In addition, developed country members use a panoply of nego
tiating strategies including threats towards poorer countries. These and other
problems with the negotiating and decisionmaking process at the WTO has

country agenda in Geneva and was not sensitive to the U.S. agenda, and the resultant calls to Presi
dent Museveni to ensure that the ambassador toed the U.S. line, see pages 179-80.
22.
See Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27, 53-58 (2003).
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unsurprisingly contributed to the two failed ministerial meetings as well as
the start-stop nature of the Doha Round.

B. Inattentiveness to Issues of Development
The GAIT was originally signed by thirty-three countries.

23

For these

largely industrial economies, the goal of the GAIT was to liberalize trade in
industrial products while ensuring that liberalization did not adversely im
24
In the 1960s and 1970s,

pact their commitment to a welfare state at home.

a number of developing countries just freed from colonial rule joined the
GATT. These countries "sought to use the organization to gain preferential
trading arrangements consistent with their development needs. Such de
mands conflicted with the trading interests of the industrialized nations that
had originated the GAIT, and thus a fundamental change was established
25
that continues to be central to the politics of the organization." The central
tension in the mission of the WTO is between its trade liberalization man
date-which is supported by its most powerful members--on the one hand,
and ensuring that trade contributes to the development goals of developing
countries, such as raising standards of living, on the other. Efforts to mediate
the tension between trade liberalization and development are incorporated in
the preamble to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, which acknowledges that
the optimal use of the world's resources must be in accordance with the
principle of sustainable development and must be with a view to raising
6
standards of living.2 Despite these efforts, little has changed in the tension
between liberalization and development within the WTO.

Behind the Scenes points to long-standing issues that continue to frus
trate developing nations, such as lack of access to largely closed Western
markets for developing countries' products and produce (pp. 5 5-56); faded
emphasis on the principle of special and differential treatment (pp. 46-47,

264-65); reduced commitment to making development and reform agricul
ture central components of the Doha agenda (pp. xxxv, 257-59); extension
of the trading regime into protecting intellectual property rights as well as
27
liberalizing trade in services, resulting in a reduction in the kind of policy

23.
Elaine S. Povich, New Era in World Trade Begins as Senate Approves GAIT Treaty, CHI.
Turn., Dec. 2, 1994, at NI.
24.
See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG., 379, 392-96 (1982).
25.

WINHAM, supra note 7, at 21.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in THE
5,
6 (1994). The view that sustainable development was a central part of the WTO's mandate was
affirmed by the Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, United States-Import P rohibition of
Cf!rtain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 'I[ 152, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). For an excellent
discussion of making trade sensitive to development issues, see U . N . DEV. PROGRAMME ET AL.,
26.

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS

MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE (2003).

27.
Other outstanding issues include the obligations on technical barriers to trade and sani
tary and phytosanitary measures in the complex agreements imposed on these countries in the
Uruguay Round.
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space that was an essential component of the institutional innovations asso
28
ciated with the economic success of East Asian economies; and how the
implementation of the WTO's trade mandates in developing countries un
dermine critical development goals, including the food security and general
livelihood of ordinary people (pp. xiii, 4-5).
What is really new in the traditional split between developed countries'
support for free-trade rules and policies on the one hand and developing
countries' support for trade development issues on the other is the unprece
dented unity of developing countries, particularly in Cancun. The Group of

20 served as an effective bulwark against the pyramidal bargaining strategy
of the United States and the European Union. The Cancun Ministerial was
scuttled by the inability of the European Union and the United States to
overcome the concerns of the Group of 20, particularly to the extent that the
views of developing countries and the issues of concern to them, such as
development, had been excluded in the draft Ministerial Declaration
(p. xvi).

Behind the Scenes therefore tells a story that is not only about the inat
tentiveness to questions of development that are of concern to developing
countries, but that also challenges theoretical work that has argued that de
veloping countries are incapable of banding together in trade negotiations
because "nations formulate their negotiating positions primarily on the basis
of economic interests, and these are usually not similar over a large number
29
of nations," or because the ideological conflict over expanding liberaliza
tion "has never been part of the trade negotiations conducted under the
30
GATT."
After Seattle and Cancun, one wonders when, if at all, trade negotiations
were ever ideologically neutral and dependent on "individual national inter
31
est." The beauty of Behind the Scenes is that it explodes the myth that
expansion of liberalization is a technocratic process barren of normative and
contentious and even ideological contests. The myth that trade negotiations
are technocratic goes back to the days of the old GATT. It was informed by
the attitude of developed countries and some scholars that issues of devel
opment were disconnected from the goal of liberalizing trade. Thus, when
developing countries brought up questions of development within GATT,
developed countries and scholars sympathetic to the narrow view of GATT
as an institution committed only to trade liberalization frowned upon such
efforts as evidence of the extent to which trade negotiations "had become a
32
general forum for a debate on international trade policy." Such views, so
skeptical of the utility of issues of development within trade negotiations,

28. Pp. 3-4, 3 1 -39, 260-63. For an excellent overview of how policy flexibility outside the
orthodoxy of IMF and World Bank reforms led to exponential export-led growth, see ALICE H.
AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 14-18, 76-78 (1989).
29.

WINHAM, supra note 7, at 274-75.

30.

Id. at 275.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 1 37.
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are eerily similar to present-day critiques of addressing developing-country
issues in the WTO.
Unfortunately, some of the critics of negotiating development issues
within the WTO equate a more democratic and development-sensitive WTO
with

the

United

Nations

Conference

on

Trade

and

Development

("UNCTAD")-a talking shop rather than an effective international trade
organization, that presumably does the bidding of the most developed mem
bers even if doing so is inimical to the interests of its developing and least
33
developed members. Only through political deliberation can trade prob
lems related to developing and least-developed countries be seen within the
context of development. For developing and least-developed countries, trade
problems are not simply a set of technical issues in which predetermined
choices are applied to separate facts from values and where generalizable
theories and policies, such as those of comparative advantage and economic
efficiency, are wholly independent from the particular social context in
34

which they are sought to be applied.

I will illustrate the foregoing approach to trade and development with an
example. Although the TRIPs agreement provides for more compliance time
for least-developed countries, these countries must still come into full com
pliance with the agreement when it becomes effective for them. The
extremely strong protections for patents in the TRIPs agreement have been
identified as barriers to affordable antiretroviral medicines for millions of
HIV-AIDS infected people, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Advocates
for flexible interpretations of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in devel
oping and least-developed countries, which are to be exempt from the TRIPs
agreement in the field of pharmaceuticals, in particular argue that flexibility

33.
According to such critics, the democratization of the WTO through measures such as
empowering the Ministerial Conference to engage in genuine negotiations rather than as a forum to
endorse predetermined decisions would transform the WTO into a debating club like UNCTAD,
where global trading and commercial rules cannot be hammered out pragmatically without the
overlay of political cache that the legitimacy crisis has created. This in turn, these critics argue, will
lead the WTO to abandon issues of importance to the Third World. See Rienhard Rode & David A.
Deese, WTO Governance-Lost in the Doha Round? (Hallenser IB-Papier 2 /2004, 2004), available
at http://www.politik.uni-halle.de/rode/texte/IB-PapierGovern0204.PDF. For a view arguing that the
UNCTAD-ization of the WTO will be bad for trade, see David Hartridge CMG, Speech at the World
Trade Post-Cancun Conference (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.sitpro.org.uk/policy/wto/confD3/
hartridge.html; see also infra note 64 and accompanying text.
34. This holistic approach has been the traditional manner in which developing countries
have approached trade issues even within the old GATT. According to one commentator:
[D]eveloping countries started from the premise that underdevelopment, even more than indi
vidual nationhood, was the most profound determinant of their identity. They sought to create
a status of underdevelopment, and to seek involvement with GATI on what appeared to be
permanently preferential grounds. They focused on the perpetuating and unchanging aspects of
their underdevelopment, and they were keenly aware of how economic disadvantages led to
disadvantages in other aspects of international life. Implicit in the status of underdevelopment
was their belief that economic benefits were owed them by right rather than by mutual ex
change, and they approached bargaining in GATI more as an exercise in collective
development planning and less as a search for individual quid pro quo. From this perspective,
the notion that the developing nations should be absolved from expectations of reciprocity in
GATI negotiations was a cardinal tenet.
WINHAM, supra note 7, at 96.
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is justifiable in light of the HIV-AIDS pandemic that is sweeping across
many developing and least-developed countries, not to mention malaria and
tuberculosis, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. According to this view, the
TRIPs agreement must be seen in light of the fact that more than twenty-five
million people have died and another twenty-five million are living with the
35
HIV-AIDS. By contrast, developed countries have rejected interpreting the
TRIPs agreement in a manner that affects its central commitments to intel
lectual property protection. The Motta text is an example of the kind of
empty concession developed countries are willing to give in that it does not
unsettle or disrupt the protection of pharmaceutical patents even in the face
of the largest and quickest-spreading public health pandemic in history
(p. xxxii).
If the WTO fails to confront and, to the extent possible, resolve the basic
value conflicts, such as those relating to the protection of patents and access
to essential medicines, the WTO will continue to remain irrelevant to the
needs and concerns of developing and least-developed countries. For this
reason, the WTO's legitimacy crisis will continue until it squarely addresses
how questions of long-standing and immediate relevance to developing
countries can be accommodated or become a central part of the trade
agenda.
IL A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF Behind

the Scenes at the WTO
Having laid down the major themes in Behind the Scenes at the WTO, I
now proceed to assess its contribution to the debate on reforming the WTO.
I do so by exploring two issues. First, I will show that while the book dis
cusses the decisionmaking process at the WTO, it ignores the equally
untransparent nature of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), al
though the DSB has contributed to the WTO's legitimacy crisis as much as
36
the opaque negotiating process that the book explores. Second, I will argue
that while the book thoroughly explores the downside of the WTO's proce
dures and methods of negotiating new trade treaties, the framework of the
book's analysis does not lend itself to tracing the bias against the interests of
developing countries to problems in the way the liberalizing mandates of the
WTO are implemented, such as the exclusion of agriculture and commodity
trade from its liberalization; instead, it traces the bias to the liberalizing
mandate generally.

35. I discuss these issues in James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End
Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REv. 727 (200 1 ), and James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 267 (2003).
See also Obijifor Aginam, From the Core to the Peripheries: Multilateral Governance of Malaria in
a Mu/ti-Cultural World, 3 CHI. J. INT'L LAW 87 (2000).
36. The authors acknowledge this problem when they note, "[w]hile it has not been dis
cussed in detail in this book, the dispute settlement mechanism is an important factor in the power
of the WTO." P. 292.
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A. On the Dispute Settlement Body
The DSB's role in construing WTO agreements by mobilizing the expert
knowledge of a group of trade-law specialists substantially contributes to the
increasingly undemocratic nature of the WTO. Because of the compulsory
and binding nature of its decisions, the DSB Is the most powerful institution
among the various bodies of the WTO. By making the DSB so powerful, the
members of the WTO effectively channeled the organization's most contro
versial issues away from guidance through democratic deliberation. In other
words, a cadre of experts with "technical knowledge" about the text of WTO
law have b�come the most important factor in decisions that would other
wise be entrusted to the political representatives of WTO member states. In
addition, the DSB hears cases in secret, away from public view, and the cri
teria for the selection of its panelists are unclear. The inadequacy of
administrative procedures and safeguards to ensure the accountability of the
37

DSB is objectionable.

These objections to the absence of clear procedural rules or their en
forcement are

strengthened

by

the

fact

that

the otherwise laudable

institutional design of having a powerful WTO judiciary may be said to re
flect a choice against empowering the WTO's decisionmaking process
through deliberation and broad-based bargaining among WTO members. A
powerful WTd judiciary arguably exists at the expense of an equally power
ful WTO legislative body that would be regarded as more representative and
legitimate. Since the DSB is not the subject of Behind the Scenes at the

WTO, we do not learn in the book how the WTO shields controversial issues
from a political process of deliberation by entrusting decisionmaking to an
opaque and powerful judiciary.
The DSB favors the interests of its most powerful members through its
interpretive role. It does so by applying or interpreting rules of the interna
tional trading regime in favor of developed countries while foreclosing
equally plausible applications and interpretations that are favorable to de37.
See Susan Esserrnan & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003,
at 130, 1 38. Esserrnan and Howse note that the secrecy of the WTO's dispute settlement submis
sions and hearings is "an unacceptable vestige of the old days of cloak-and-dagger diplomacy." Id.
The Global Administrative Law Project at New York University Law School has noted the system
atic absence of such safeguards in a variety of multilateral institutions that have regulatory impact
within countries. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law (Int')
Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2004/ l , 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=692628. The absence of safeguards to ensure the accountability of the DSB
or mechanism for their enforcement is reflected by the fact that in at least one case, a panelist in a
DSB case had a conflict of interest. In the Tuna-Dolphin II case, panelist Alan Oxley was found to
have represented the Brock Group, which, according to the company's brochure, lobbied on behalf
of the Mexican government for NAFfA. Mexico had a direct interest in the outcome of the case as it
was the initiator of the Tuna-Dolphin I case that Tuna Dolphin II sought to enforce. See Lori Wal
lach, Testimony of Lori Wallach Regarding U. S. Preparation for the World Trade Organi?,ation 's
1999 Ministerial Meeting, Pua. CITIZEN, May 14, 1 9 9 9 , http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/Qatar/
seattle_mini/articles.cfm?ID=5468.
In September 2005, the WTO for the first time opened up panel proceedings of the dispute set
tlement body to the public. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Opens Panel Proceeding
to Public for the First Time (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/
news05_elopenpanel_l2sep_e.htm.
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veloping countries and are entirely consistent with the rules of the interna
tional trading regime. Thus in two different cases raising exactly the same
8
question under Article 1 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,3 which was

consciously designed to benefit developing countries, the DSB reached two

different interpretations: one favoring developing countries and the other
favoring developed countries. 39
Article 1 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for "constructive

remedies" as an alternative to the imposition of anti-dumping duties.40 This
"special regard" remedy is applicable where "the essential interests of de

veloping country Members" would be affected.4 1 In the Doha negotiations,

developing countries have therefore argued that before a developed country
applies an anti-dumping measure that would adversely affect the essential
interests of a developing country, constructive remedies should be ex
plored.42 This was India's argument in the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing

Measures on Steel Plate from India Case ("Steel Plate Case"). India argued
that the United States had violated "the first sentence of Article 1 5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, which states in relevant part that ' [i]t is recog

nized that special regard must be given by developed country Members,' by
failing to give special regard to India's status as a developing country when
considering the application of anti-dumping duties."43 According to India,
the mandatory first sentence in Article 1 5 imposed an obligation, the pa
rameters

of

which

would

be

determined

based

on

the

facts

and

circumstances of each particular case.44

The Appellate Body of the DSB held that the first sentence of Article 1 5

did not impose any "specific or general obligation on Members to undertake
any particular action.'"'5 This departs from a tradition under which Article

17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement allows a member state to construe

favorably provisions such as Article 1 5 that are broad and general and are

capable of admitting different possible interpretations if the member state

38. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATI, Apr. 15, 1994, in THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGaTIATIONS, supra note 26, at 168 [hereinafter
Anti-Dumping Agreement]. The purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "is to counteract the
effects of price discrimination in sales by a foreign producer which results in injury to the industry
of the importing country." James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through International
Legal Minimalism: A Re-Characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcoN. L. l, 53 (2004 ).
39 . I draw this example from an earlier paper. See James Gathii, Fairness as Fidelity to Mak
ing the WTO F ully Responsive to All Its Members, 96 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 157 (2003).
40.

Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38.

41.

Id.

42.
See generally Victor Mosoti, In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to
the Remedial Deficiences in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process; A View from Sub-Saharan Africa,
19 B.U. INT'L L. J. 231 (2001 ).
43. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38, at art. 15 ; see Panel Report, United States
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate From India, 'JI 7.104, WT/DS206/R
(June 28, 2002) [hereinafter Steel P late Case].
44.

Steel P late Case, supra note 43, 'JI 7.110.

45.

Id.

Michigan Law Review

1 376

[Vol. 104:1 361

46
acted in accordance with "one of those permissible interpretations." The
AB ' s interpretation is consistent with an approach that conceptualizes
claims made by developing countries in the international economic realm of
trade, investment, and finance as occupying no more than a vague, nonlegal,
47
By contrast, this conceptualization ineluctably

and at times political status.

favors claims couched in the protective garb of WTO law, which develop
ing-country members are less likely to have the expertise and experience to
48
d0.
It is important to observe here that it was open to the AB to, for exam
ple, consider Article 1.5 as requiring no more than a balanced trading
framework given the propensity of developing-country anti-dumping law to
target developing countries, which are unable to retaliate against those
,49
"most capable of dumping their exports'
on them. In fact, in the Anti

Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India Case
50
("Bed Linen Case"), the European Union agreed with India's view that the
second sentence of Article 1 5 imposed a legal obligation on developed
country members to explore the possibilities of constructive remedies before
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the e:;sential interests
51
of developing-country members. Although the AB concluded that the sec
ond sentence of Article 15 does not predetermine any particular outcome, it
nevertheless observed that the " 'exploration' of possibilities must be ac

tively undertaken by the developed country authorities with a willingness to
52
reach a positive outcome."
.
In addition, in the Steel Plate Case, the AB held that simply because the
Indian company was operating in a developing country "does not mean that
it somehow shares the 'special situation' of the developing country Mem
53
ber." This holding raises a rhetorical question: what would it take to have
Article 1 5 construed in favor of a developing country? It is important to note
here that in the Steel Plate Case, U.S. Department of Commerce officials
had orally informed Indian officials that the U.S. steel industry and Con
54
gress would oppose an agreement under Article 15. Although the AB
46.

Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38, art. 17 .6( ii).

4 7.
The characterization of the issue of access to essential medicines as a nontrade or a po
litical issue that cannot be accommodated within the TRIPs agreement is another example of such a
disempowering characterization that disproportionately affects developing-country populations
adversely.
48. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; see also James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status
of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 291, 315 (2002).
49.
Alexander Roitinger, Antidumping Refonn, Trade Policy Flexibility, and Compensation
( Univ. Saint Gallen, Discussion Paper No. 2002-1 8,. 2002).
50. Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on lmpons of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000).
51.

Id. 'l[ 6.221.

52 .

Id. 'l[ 6.233 ( emphasis added).

53.

Steel P late Case, supra note 43, 'l[ 7.111.

54.

Id. 'l[ 7.105.
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agreed that the United States did entertain the proposal and that it therefore
was in compliance with Article 1 5 , the effect of the decision was to read out
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement the apparent effect of Article 15 for devel
oping countries.
It is not surprising therefore that the United States favors price undertak
55
ings as an alternative to anti-dumping measures under Article 1 5 and, as it
argued in the Steel Plate Case, it does not believe Article 1 5 of the Anti
Dumping Agreement imposes "any specific legal obligations on developed
56
country Members." Price undertakings are allowed as a substitute to anti
dumping measures under Article 8, which provides:
Proceedings may be suspended or terminated without imposition of provi
sional measures or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory
voluntary undertakings from any exporter to revise its prices or to cease its
exports to the area in question at dumped prices that the authorities are sat
57
isfied that the i nj urious effect of the dumping is eliminated.

These opposing interpretations of Article 1 5 demonstrate that there is
more at stake than simply making anti-dumping investigations more trans
parent. There are choices that have to be made between alternative proposals
regarding the implementation of anti-dumping measures, especially against
developing countries. Indeed, a group of developing countries has raised the
need to clarify various provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, includ
ing the specific meaning of "ordinary course of trade," "constructed value,"
and "the lesser duty rule." Developing countries have also sought a formal
58
ban on the practice of zeroing, which two AB decisions have struck down.
A call for outlawing a practice already found to be inconsistent with the
agreement indicates the level of legal insecurity that developing countries
experience at the WTO. Some developing-country members have also pro
posed reducing the application of anti-dumping measures against developing

55.
Price undertakings are import price minima or thresholds. See Michael 0. Moore, VERs
and Price Undertakings Under the WTO, 13 REv. INT'L EcoN. 298 (2005).
56.

Steel P late Case, supra note 43, 'l[ 7. !06.

57.

Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 38, at

art.

8.

58. Position papers were presented prior to Doha by South Africa, Colombia, Korea, Guate
mala, India, and Romania. See Communication from South Africa, South African Development
Community Ministers' Agreed Negotiating Objectives for the Third WTO Ministerial Conference,
WT/U317 (Oct. l, 1 999); Communication from Colombia, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial
Conference, W T/GC/W/315 (Sept. 14, 1 999); Communication from Korea-Revision, Preparations
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, W T/GC/W/235/Rev.l (Oct. 1 1 , 1999); Communication from
Guatemala, P reparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, W TIGCIW/330 (Sept. 23, 1999);
Communication from India, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, W T/GC/W /200
(June 14, 1999); Communication from Romania, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference,
WT/GC/W/319 (Sept. 15, 1999).
Since Doha, communications from Canada and India have raised similar concerns. See
Communication from Canada, Improved Disciplines Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun
tervailing Measures and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, TN/RUW/ l ( Apr. 15, 2002 ); Submission by
India, Proposals on Implementation Related Issues and Concerns, TN/RUW/4 ( Apr. 25, 2002); see
also Paper from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mex
ico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, Anti-Dumping: lllustrative Major
issues, TN/RUW/6 ( Apr. 26, 2002).
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5
countries. 9 Japan and Chile have proposed even further-reaching changes
that would limit the application of anti-dumping measures to predatory pricmg practices.
•

•

60

Given the growing importance of anti-dumping, especially among de
6
veloping countries, 1 and its continuing role to soothe domestic industries in

industrial economies such as the United States that suffer at the hands of
62
international competition, compromise will not be easily realized. In par
ticular, the U . S . Congress has now given the nonnefotiability of trade
6
A bargaining posi

remedy laws legislative blessing in the 2002 Trade Act.

tion that precludes renegotiation of the anti-dumping regime gives the DSB
enormous authority since its interpretations are the only avenue by which
developing countries can hope to check the abuses of developed countries.
Yet, as the foregoing decisions show, the DSB cannot be trusted to consis

tently check developed countries' abuses of anti-dumping, even when the
rules allow for checking such abuses. Crucially, developing countries have
not been able to shape the emerging DSB jurisprudence to favor their inter

ests in the way that developed countries have been able to do because they

lack the legal expertise necessary to challenge a developed country at the
DSB , not to mention the resources to support the prohibitive cost of such
services.
•

64

Because of the opaqueness of its decisionmaking process and the sus
ceptibility of its rules to be construed in favor of some countries and against

others despite the availability of alternative interpretations, the DSB is not

59. Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda, Preparations for the 1999 Ministe
rial Conference, WT/GC/W/354 (Oct. 1 1 , 1999).
60. Communication from Japan, P reparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Proposal
on Anti-Dumping Measures, WT/GC/W/240 (July 6, 1 999); Communication from Chile, P repara
tions for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Proposal on Anti-Dumping Measures, WT/GC/W/366
(Oct. 12, 1 999).
6 1 . New Antidumping lnvestigations Decline But More Measures lmposed, WTO Repons, 19
INT'L TRADE REP. 1 860. Although there were eighty-two fewer anti-dumping investigations started
in the second half of 2002 compared with the first half of 2002, developing countries are using the
anti-dumping regime even more. For example, India retained its premier position in initiating new
anti-dumping investigations while countries such as Argentina, Egypt, Mexico, and Thailand had
become popular users.
62.

Sharyn O'Halloran argues:

[I]nterest group influence has already been incorporated into the regulatory process through
the procedures that govern administrative decision making. That is, the standards by which in
dustries qualify for government assistance, whether it be anti-dumping actions or trade
adjustment assistance, are themselves the result of the political process. Thus interest group in
fluence may be apparent not at regulatory proceedings, but rather in the standards of proof
applied at these proceedings.
SHARYN O'HALLORAN, POLITICS, PROCESS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 1 8 1 (1 994).

63.

Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(l4), 1 16 Stat. 933, 1001 (2002).

64.
Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in INT ' L CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE WTO 1 (2003),
available at http://www.icstd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf.
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an appropriate forum to decide the broad range of questions confronting the
WTO.
B . Market Failure and Asymmetrical Application of Market Nonns
My second major critique focuses on the nonrecognition of market fail
ure and the asymmetrical application of market norms in Behind the Scenes

at the WTO. The book traces bias against developing countries predomi
65
nantly to the methods of negotiating trade agreements among countries and
to the WTO's "free trade ideology," which the authors recommend should be
reconsidered and "thrown out" (p. lxxi). The book understates the fact that
bias against developing countries is not simply the inevitable outcome of
free-market ideologies, but that it is also due to the manner in which market
66
norms have or have not been mobilized. For more than fifty years, global
trade negotiations reduced tariffs on the manufacturing and industrial sec
tors in which developed economies led the world, while areas such as
agriculture, textiles, and clothing-where low-cost developing countries
have the comparative advantage-were heavily protected and subsidized by
rich industrialized countries. For example, the United States and the Euro
pean Union each give more than one billion dollars in agricultural subsidies
annually, undermining the comparative advantage that developing countries
67

enjoy in agricultural trade.

This reluctance to extend market principles to areas in which developing
countries had a comparative advantage is not the inexorable outcome of the
application of free-market principles, but rather is due to their selective ap
plication. The free-trade mandate of the WTO does not apply equally to
industrial and agricultural products. Behind the Scenes at the WTO over
states the effect of relations of domination and dependence (p. 305). While
this dynamic certainly exists, as evidenced by the reasons given for Nige68
and the Philippines' recent threats to pull out of the WT0, the book

,}ia's

understates the extent to which biased applications of market norms are an
essential aspect of the legitimacy crisis at the WTO.
Although the United States and countries in the European Union are not
the lowest-cost producers of cotton, they have continued to be effectively
insulated from having a legal obligation not to subsidize their own high-cost
producers of cotton. U.S. and E.U. cotton farmers receive billions of dollars

in subsidies, at the expense of much lower-cost producers in developing
countries. Despite victories against cotton and sugar subsidies in the DSB

65.

See supra Part I.

66.

For an excellent analysis of how market nonns do not have a fixed natural and necessary
meaning but are rather contingent, see Joel M. Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in
Market Democracies: Problematic Ideological Issues Raised By Land Registration, 25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 467, 468-75 (2004).

67.

U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 26, at 123.

68.

Pp. 177, 1 83. These threats arise from these countries' sense that the global trading re

gime is rigged against them.
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developing countries cannot vigorously enforce anti-subsidy rules

in the same way that the United States and the European Union can. Devel
oping countries simply lack the market power that developed countries have
by virtue of their lion's share of global trade. Since developing countries
rely on the openness of developed-country markets to generate foreign ex
change, they do not have the market power to sanction or even threaten
developed countries that use their power to manipulate the rules of the trad
ing framework. B y contrast, the mere threat of sanctions by a developed
country against a developing country often creates the result desired by the
70
developed country.
The United States' market power enables it to continue heavily subsidiz
ing its farmers, yet only three percent of the U.S . population is engaged in
agriculture compared to over seventy percent of the population engaged in
agriculture in developing countries. The cotton subsidies in the United
States and the European Union have, in effect, pushed the livelihoods of
over ten million otherwise lowest-cost cotton farmers in Central and West
Africa to the poverty line, if not below it. Subsidies also make it impossible
71

for poor countries to get their share of global trade.

Cotton subsidies are simply the tip of the iceberg. The GATT-WTO
treaty framework is full of examples of a basic lack of fidelity to making the
basic rules of the global trading framework apply equally to all products.
This has been a major reason for the current deadlock in WTO negotiations.
For example, the 1948 GATT and the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture have
legalized exceptions to market access and the nondiscrimination norms of
72
Article XI:2(c)(i) of the 1948 GATT exempted

the trading framework.

quantitative restrictions in agriculture from the GATT's nondiscrimination
mandates. In 1955, the GATT waived the preconditions of discriminating
against imported products under Article XI:2(c)(i), giving the United States
a free hand to restrict agricultural imports. GATT Article XVI:3 authorized
agricultural subsidies although no such subsidies were allowed for industrial.
73
goods. These exceptions introduced double standards for developed and
developing countries by allowing agriculture to be treated outside the non
discrimination disciplines of the GATT framework. The 1994 Agreement on
Agriculture, while an improvement over the 1948 GATT, also introduced its
own legalized exceptions exempting agriculture from full liberalization.
In addition to these legalized exceptions, markets are imperfect because
they are subject to problems such as externalities, information asymmetries,
69. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Expon Subsidies on Sugar, WT/
DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005); Appellate Body Report, United
States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
70. Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Compara tive Institutional Approach, in POWER I N GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1 30 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
71.
OF

THE

WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EcONOMIC PROSPECTS: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE
DOHA AGENDA 1 07--08 (2003), available at http://sitesources.worldbank.org/

INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf.
72.

Gathii, supra note 1 2, at 91 1 n. 1 29.

73.

Id.
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and other types of market failure. Markets are therefore susceptible to ma
nipulation, with the result that outcomes at odds with the virtues associated
with free markets are commonplace. For example, theWTO's trade liberali
zation mandates often work at cross purposes with theWorld Bank's poverty
74
reduction programs implemented by poor countries. Another type of mar
ket failure is evidenced by the fact that the costs of implementing Uruguay
Round commitments such as the TRIPs agreement have been so costly that
they have undermined any potential benefits they may confer on developing
and least-developed countries. This is not to mention that the TRIPs agree
ment results in wealth transfer on the order of $5.8 billion annually from
75
developing countries to the United States.
These examples demonstrate that the WTO is caught on a seismic fault
line. On the one side are its most powerful members, bent on ensuring that
the global trading agenda continues to create new and profitable opportuni
ties for their citizens while preserving old opportunities. On the other side of
the fault line are developing and least-developed countries and their direct
and urgent demands to have the trading regime address questions of poverty
and social division, especially by removing distortions in global agricultural
trade. The rich countries seek to protect current WTO privileges while ex
tending obligations into new areas where they have a comparative
advantage. For developing countries, by contrast, negotiations should focus
on lightening existing obligations while paying more attention to issues of
development. These conflicting goals of the rich and poor members of the
WTO have generated fierce discussions and stalled negotiations in the Doha
Round. Unsurprisingly, the tensions produced by these conflicting visions of
the future of the WTO led to the collapses of the 1999 ministerial confer
ence in Seattle and the 2004 ministerial conference in Cancun.
A basic problem with how the WTO has addressed the concerns of de
veloping and least-developed countries is that it has sought to interpret their
demands for reform in ways that do not disturb the rigged rules of global
agricultural trade. The WTO has failed to squarely address the possibility
that the continuation of distorted and unfair global agricultural trade rules
informs the disenchantment of developing and least-developed countries
with the global trading system. Instead, the WTO has sought to simply ad
just its trade liberalization agenda at the margins to accommodate
developing and least-developed countries. Ultimately, a major task in WTO
reform is to determine how to encourage its members, especially the rich
est countries and their citizens, to act beyond the immediacy of their local
needs and regard the needs of others-even if they live across national

74. J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments:
The Development Challenge 1 , 1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. WPS 2215, 1 999), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/941 .pdf.
75. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Issues for the New Round, in THE WTO AFTER
SEATTLE 1 37, 142 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000).
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76

Only then would it be

possible to ensure that market norms applied to all products and produce,
irrespective of their origin.
CONCLUSION
If the WTO is really a member-driven organization in which decisions
are made by consensus, as it claims to be, then it ought to open itself up to
competing ideas and viewpoints about its role, particularly with reference to
issues of concern to developing and least-developed countries. As Jawara
and Kwa have shown, the WTO Secretariat in particular cannot be trusted to

be an "honest broker," listening to the diverse views of the WTO member
ship (pp. 22 1, 228). By usurping the role of overseeing negotiations
inconsistently with the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO members end up

negotiating with the Secretariat rather than with each other (pp. 63-64, 224-

28, 255-56, 259). The Secretariat has demonstrated itself to be incapable of
facilitating the open debate that would ensure that all views are represented
and taken into account in arriving at new agreements, resolving outstanding
implementation issues raised by members, or addressing such other issues
as genuine liberalization of global agricultural trade (pp. xli-xliii).

To correct these shortcomings, all the members of the WTO must come

up with a democratic decisionmaking framework within which there are

clear criteria for inclusive decisionrnaking. These criteria would replace the
current consensus model adopted by the WTO, which Jawara and Kwa have
demonstrated is both a charade and a convenient mask for pushing through
the agenda of the most powerful members of the WTO. It would also mean
abandoning the criticisms that have been leveled against debating the
agenda of the WTO as recommended by developing and least-developed
countries. Such criticisms are exemplified by the remarks of the then USTR,

Robert Zoellick, after the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial. Zoellick ar
gued that the rhetoric of "won't do" countries overwhelmed the willingness
77
of "can do" countries to work out a compromise at Cancun. I agree with
78
Richard Steinberg when he dismisses such claims precisely because they
seek to undermine the very things that could rebuild trust within the trading
framework amongst all its members.

How can the WTO rebuild trust? After the collapse of the 1999 ministe

rial in Seattle, the WTO adopted nonbinding guidelines on how to proceed
with negotiations, but these guidelines were not followed at the Doha Minis

terial and certainly not at the Cancun Ministerial (pp. 278-79). Developing

76. See RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003); James Gathii,
International Justice and the Trading Regime, EMORY INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
77. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Waitfor the Won't-Do Countries, FIN. TI MES (Lon
don), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23; see also RODE & DEESE, supra note 33; WTO Chair Suggests
Developing Countries Overplayed Hand on Cotton Issue, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. 1 889, 1 889 (Nov.
1 3 , 2003).
78. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. I. INT'L L. 247 (2004).
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countries proposed that the Trade Negotiations Committee ("TNC") that
was set up at the Doha Ministerial conference in 200 1 to oversee the Doha

negotiating mandate should oversee the Doha negotiations rather than the
7
Secretariat. 9 Under the Doha mandate, the TNC supervises negotiations
80
"under the authority of the General Council." Developing countries have

argued that it is the prerogative of the members, through the TNC, rather
than the General Council and the Secretariat, to oversee negotiations (pp.

227-28). According to these countries, Article VI:4 of the Marrakesh

81
Agreement precludes the staff of the Secretariat from being involved in the
negotiating process and, in particular, from directing the process by having

the Chair of the General Council simultaneously serving as the Chair of the
TNC. This position is also informed in part by a desire not to repeat the ex
perience of the Uruguay Round, at which the members of the WTO
ended up negotiating with the Secretariat rather than amongst themselves
(pp. 221, 228).
These countries, therefore, proposed putting in place clear and binding
rules to govern the negotiating process not only before the TNC, but also in
the conduct of the business of the various councils established under a vari
ety of treaties and plurilateral agreements, as well as all committees, working
parties, groups, and monitoring bodies that comprise the entire WTO machin

ery. With regard to the TNC, the following rules would apply under this
proposal: the roles of the TNC and the General Council would be separated;
all negotiations would take place in formal sessions without concurrent

informal meetings; selection of the chair of the TNC and all negotiating
groups would be by consensus and would be made from the membership of
the General Council; minutes of all meetings would be kept and made avail

able within ten days of the meeting; all drafting of texts would be done in
open meetings with all language in disagreement appearing in brackets; and
finally, negotiating texts would be made available to member delegations in
the three official languages of the WTO two weeks in advance, to enable
8
them to study them and consult with their capitals for instructions. 2

79. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 , '[ 46,
WT/MIN(Ol )/DEC/l, 4 1 l.L.M. 746 (2002) ("The overall conduct of the negotiations shall be su
pervised by a Trade Negotiations Committee under the authority of the General Council. The Trade
Negotiations Committee shall hold its first meeting not later than 31 January 2002. It shall establish
appropriate negotiating mechanisms as required and supervise the progress of the negotiations.").
80.

Id.

Article VI:4 o f the Marrakesh Agreement provides in part that "the staff o f the Secre
tariat shall be exclusively international in character." Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38, art.
VI, '[ 4. This provision somewhat coincides with article V(5)(c) of the Articles of Agreement of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), which provides that the
"President, officers and staff of the Bank, in the discharge of their offices, owe their duty entirely to
the Bank and to no authority." Int'! Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Articles of Agreement,
art. V, '[ 5(c) (Feb. 1 6, 1 989), available at http://siteresources. worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/
Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf. "Each member of the bank shall respect the international
character ofthis duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence any of them in the discharge of
their duties." Id. (emphasis added).

81.

82. See pp. 2 1 9-24; Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Pakistan,
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, Establishment of the Trade Negotiations Committee and
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Reforms such as these, aimed at improving transparency, accountability, and
openness, are critical to restoring trust among the members of the WTO.
Unfortunately, developed countries prefer fewer and vaguer guidelines, to
83
give them maximum leverage in negotiations.
Making clear rules for the participation of nonstate actors within the
WTO's decisionmaking process is important. Facilitating the participation
of nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") based in developing countries
and representing the interests of those most adversely affected by trade is
84
Such participatory rules ought to be made without ro

particularly crucial.

manticized conceptions that overstate the importance of NGOs in creating
85
While NGOs are often por

accountability and transparency at the WT0.

trayed as grassroots alternatives or antidotes to a state-centric and market
oriented trading framework that is insensitive to the concerns of the poor
and those displaced by trade, this is not always true of all NGOs. First, not
all NGOs incorporate a pro-poor agenda. They may represent the conflicting
interests of different "losers" in global trade. For example, the NGOs that
represent the interests of agriculture in the United States or in Europe have
different agendas than those that represent the displaced cotton farmers of
86
Central and West Africa. Focusing on the common loss due to free trade
87
may underplay national, gender, class, and other differences.
Inclusion of NGOs as part of WTO reform must be done cautiously,
guarding against the possibility that increased participation by nonstate ac
tors will simply intensify the struggle over which set of forces will
constitute a reformed WTO. Most importantly, reforms aimed at greater
Related Issues WT/GC/58

(Dec.

21,

2001 ),

available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/

library.cfm?reflD=25737.
83.

P. 278.

An important recent report argues that "[w]e do not believe a set of inflexible

rules for the conduct and preparation of Ministerial conferences is the answer." SUTHERLAND ET

AL., supra note 17, at 7 1 . The report also endorses a continuation of green-room meetings to which
Id. at 72-73.

only a few countries are invited.
84.

As Daniel C. Esty argues, NGOs are the connective tissue between the WTO and civil

Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Coop
eration, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT L EcoN. L. 123 ( 1 998).

society. Daniel C. Esty,

'

85.

Local and transnational networks and alliances are not necessarily pro-poor.

See Gillian

Hart, Paper for the Conference on Creative Destruction at CUNY Graduate Center: Denaturalizing
Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of Resurgent Imperialism (Apr. 1 5- 1 7 , 2004),

available at http://geography.berkeley.edu/PeopleHistory/faculty/GHart_CreativeDestruction.pdf.
86.

Thus according to Raustiala:

[N]ot all states benefit, nor in the aggregate can NGO participation be considered an unmiti
gated good. Lobbyists in the U.S. Congress, for instance, provide many of same services to
legislators-information, political cover, monitoring of deals, and so forth . . . . Yet few ap
plaud the role of lobbyists in American politics . . . . Civil society is not inherently "good" and
state power "bad." Enhanced participation by civil society in governance may enhance the
power of self-interested groups that are already powerful-in resources, organization, political
influence-and this may undermine the political processes and lead to a low level of regime
effectiveness.
Kai Raustiala,

States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT'L STUD. Q. 7 19,

726 ( 1 997).
87.
For a similar critique, see Giles Mohan & Kristian Stokke, Participatory Development
and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 247, 264 (2000).
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transparency must go hand in hand with a commitment in principle as well
as in praxis to address issues of development and the liberalization of agri
culture. Such reforms will go furthest in resolving the present crisis at the
WTO. As a strategy, developing countries must emphasize the procedural
aspects of the reform agenda, since they will shape and form the discursive
terrain within which the inextricably linked issues of agricultural trade re
88
form and inclusion of development issues will play out.
Strengthening the WTO's negotiating framework and the DSB by com
mitting to reforms aimed at greater transparency and inclusiveness will
restart multilateral negotiations-as developed countries wish to do-and
would strengthen the WTO by giving developing countries a space within
which to collectively negotiate with developed countries. Thus, reforms
aimed at rebuilding trust will benefit both developing and developed coun
tries. Such reforms would also refocus attention away from forum-shifting
into bilateral and regional trade treaties, in which individual countries bar
89
gaining with the United States may not have much leverage.

Behind the Scenes at the WTO proceeds from the premise that bias
against developing-country interests at the WTO is necessarily the discerni
ble

and

determinate

outcome

of

the

WTO's

market-based

trade

liberalization model as well as its undemocratic decisionmaking methods. In
this Review, I have shown that by tracing bias against developing countries
as such, Jawara and Kwa overemphasize the origin of the bias in the public
realm of intersovereign relations among the WTO's member states. In so
doing, they understate how the private-law norms of free trade, including the
market, are deployed in a manner that benefits the interests of the WTO's
richest members at the expense of its poorest members. Thus, while I agree
88.

A s Gillian Hart argues:

Discourses and processes of globalization are inextricably linked-indeed dialectically
connected with one another, and deeply infused with the exercise of power. Precisely because the
categories and discursive strategies that we use to describe processes have real effects-<lefining
and delimiting terrains of practical action and the formation of political identities-discourses of
globalization actively shape the very processes they purport to describe. The discursive power of
globalization is most clearly evident in practices of meaning-making that portray neoliberal forms
of capitalism as natural, inevitable, and beyond question.

GILLIAN HART, DISABLING GLOBALIZATION: PLACES OF POWER IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
293 (2002).

89.

WTO mini-ministerials also fall in this category of forum shifting.

See pp. !xiii, 59--62.

Former USTR Robert Zoellick has j ustified regional/bilateral agreements for exactly the opposite
reasons. After the conclusion of such an agreement with the Dominican Republic he commented:
It is my firm belief that if we enter into an agreement in which the developing countries feel
that they have actually negotiated the agreement as opposed to having had an agreement thrust
upon them, that it will be both more stable, more satisfactory, and it will provide a platform for
real positive growth, an economic partnership over the coming years.

B.

Con ference: Linkin g Trade and Sustainable Development: Keynote Address, 1 8
L. REV. 1 27 1 , 1 30 1 ; s ee also WORLD TRADE 0RG., A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DIS
PUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1 09 (2004) (arguing that bilateral trade agreements give developing
countries more bargaining viz a viz developed countries like the United States because the WTO's

Emmy

Simmons,

AM. U. INT'L.

dispute settlement system is intricate and its substantive law difficult for developing countries to
master with a view to bringing a complaint).

But see S haffer, supra note 70 (arguing that such forum

shifting leads to the isolation of dissenting countries until they relent).
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with Jawara and Kwa that the decisionmaking processes of the WTO must
become more inclusive, transparent, and participatory, I also maintain that
expanding the WTO's stated organizational mandate of free trade to agricul
ture and other areas in which developing countries have a comparative
advantage ought to be an integral part of the reform agenda at the WTO. By
paying attention to the differential application of free-trade norms as be
tween developed and developing countries within the WTO, both in the
enactment of new rules and in the application of existing ones by the dispute
settlement body and by developed country members, I have sought to give a
more complete picture of the high stakes of the WTO reform. At the end of
the day, extending liberalization to agriculture and limiting the expansion of
the trading regime only into areas in which developed countries have a
comparative advantage, among other challenges facing developing countries
in the trading regime, are challenges inextricably linked to reforming the
undemocratic and untransparent decisionmaking process at the WTO.

